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Scholars and policymakers in the West commonly hold that when liberal countries intervene 
to stop genocide, they subsequently ought to establish democratic political institutions to 
enable peaceful collective self-determination. I argue that this guidance is problematic. First, 
introducing electoral democracy in deeply ethnically divided societies—especially but not 
only after genocide—often results in either tyrannical majority rule or deadlocked decision 
making rather than inclusive collective self-determination. Second, normatively speaking, 
John Rawls made a strong case that inclusive self-determination can be achieved through 
“decent,” less than democratic political structures that enable group-based representation. 
Bringing these insights together, I argue that particularly for postgenocidal societies that lack 
prior experience with liberal democratic rule, outside interveners should stop short of actively 
promoting Western-style democracy and instead consider promoting hybrid political 
institutions that combine popularly elected bodies with customary authority structures. Such 
hybrid institutions can prevent tyrannical majority rule as well as decision-making deadlock. 
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It is a widely held belief that international interveners should promote democracy after ending 
mass atrocities because democracy advances human rights, fosters accountable government, 
and facilitates sustained economic growth. This “liberal peace” paradigm has guided the 
activities of Western militaries, donors, and civil society organizations since the early 1990s 
(Western 2012). Scholarship on jus post bellum, or justice after war, has incorporated core 
elements of this paradigm: prominent scholars posit a “duty” to promote postbellum 
democracy, especially after humanitarian interventions to stop genocide. In situations in 
which the incumbent regime has carried out or abetted genocide, the argument goes, liberal 
interveners ought to forcibly dismantle the existing regime and help establish democratic 
political institutions. This is required to punish those complicit in the crime of genocide and to 
enable a new political beginning based on peaceful collective self-determination (see esp. 
Orend 2002; Bass 2004; but also Stahn 2006; Jacob 2014; Doyle 2015; Pattison 2015).1  
I argue that the injunction to promote democracy after humanitarian interventions to 
stop genocide is problematic. Outsiders may need to remove from power senior political elites 
complicit in the genocide so that vulnerable groups can be safe from further atrocities and the 
society can peacefully determine its own future. However, I dispute that this political 
transformation should necessarily culminate in the introduction of Western-style electoral 
democracy. International interveners should stop short of actively promoting democratic 
institutions based on competitive elections after genocide, especially in societies that lack 
prior experience with liberal democratic rule.  
In societies torn apart by genocide and other forms of acute ethnic violence, electoral 
democracy is unlikely to foster inclusive collective self-determination and provide adequate 
safeguards for ethnocultural minorities. Indeed, there is a significant chance that democracy 
will facilitate tyrannical rule by ethnic majorities (Mann 2005) or, if no single group prevails, 
                                                 
1 This responsibility to democratize is assigned specifically to liberal interveners, for, as Bass (2004, 401) puts it, 
“if it is an illiberal state that carries out the humanitarian intervention, one would not like to see it also undertake 
a political reconstruction [i.e., constitutional transformation] afterward.” 
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result in deadlocked decision making (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Horowitz 2014). Either 
way, the introduction of competitive elections in such deeply fractured societies can be 
expected to sustain high levels of ethnic conflict, with potentially destabilizing consequences 
(Snyder 2002; Sisk 2008).  
Moreover, from a normative perspective, John Rawls (1999) made a strong case that 
inclusive collective self-determination can be achieved through “decent,” less than democratic 
political structures that enable group-based representation. Rawls’s prototypical “decent 
hierarchical society” is endowed with effective laws that are grounded in local custom, and 
although there is no democratic accountability, policymakers accommodate the interests of all 
established social groups. Rawls’s republican liberalism, which emphasizes the moral 
significance of collective self-determination, demands that we accept such nondemocratic 
societies as legitimate (Macedo 2004; Wenar 2006).  
Bringing these insights together, I argue that those who intervene to stop genocide— 
but also external peacebuilders in deeply divided societies generally—should take seriously 
the possibility of limiting democracy by promoting hybrid political institutions that combine 
popularly elected bodies with customary authority structures. Hybrid institutions that 
incorporate customary authorities (e.g., traditional chiefs, members of the local nobility, and 
other unelected leaders) reduce the likelihood that extreme ethnonationalists will come to 
control the political process. Furthermore, hybrid institutions, if carefully designed, can 
provide meaningful checks on executive power while facilitating pragmatic compromise and 
deliberation between groups. Consequently, such institutions can help prevent tyrannical 
majority rule as well as ethnic deadlock (Menkhaus 2000; Belloni 2012). Hybrid institutions 
grounded in indigenous custom are also likely to enjoy significant local legitimacy, thus 
encouraging political participation and voluntary compliance with public laws (Boege, 
Brown, and Clements 2009).  
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For illustration purposes, I briefly discuss existing hybrid governance structures in 
Somaliland and Bougainville. In Somaliland, a de facto state in the Horn of Africa that 
experienced significant communal violence during the 1990s, a newly established hybrid 
political system balances the powers of a democratically elected president and lower 
legislative chamber with those of a nonelected upper chamber made up of clan elders. In 
Bougainville, an autonomous island in the South Pacific that was also torn apart by communal 
violence, outsiders have supported a postwar institutional architecture that combines a 
democratically elected central government with customary rule at the local level. These 
examples, though imperfect, indicate that hybrid institutions can foster a fairly inclusive and 
socially legitimate postwar politics, thus approximating the Rawlsian ideal of decency.   
The article is structured as follows. Part one clarifies the meaning of collective self-
determination in societies made up of several established ethnic groups.2 Part two reviews 
prominent arguments in favor of external democratization after humanitarian interventions to 
stop genocide. Part three highlights the downsides of such postbellum democracy promotion 
in deeply divided societies, drawing on evidence from recent cases. Part four examines in 
greater detail the Rawlsian argument on how decent political institutions can suffice for 
meaningful collective self-determination. Part five presents the case for promoting hybrid 
institutions that approximate Rawlsian decency in postgenocidal societies and, more 
generally, in societies torn apart by acute ethnic violence. Part six examines key aspects of 
hybrid governance frameworks in Somaliland and Bougainville to illustrate how such 
arrangements can facilitate inclusive self-determination in practice.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Throughout the article, I follow Chandra (2005, 236) in using the term “ethnic” as shorthand for 
ethnolinguistic, tribal, and religious. 
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Inclusive self-determination in divided societies 
Republican liberals since Giuseppe Mazzini and John Stuart Mill have viewed the nation 
primarily as a political project based on the voluntary association of individuals. For these 
thinkers, national or collective self-determination encapsulates the ideal of a people that 
manage their own affairs through participatory political institutions and free from external 
domination (French and Gutman 1974; Philpott 1995). Collective self-determination, thus 
understood, does not require independent statehood, as it can be achieved through substate 
autonomy arrangements whereby a group exercises “some independent political control over 
some significant aspect of its common life” (Buchanan 2003, 33; see also Patten 2016). 
In states that are made up of several established ethnic groups, collective self-
determination can occur at different levels. First, the state’s domestic political structure may 
grant each established ethnic group a right to internal self-determination, in the form of 
cultural autonomy, as well as territorial self-rule where feasible. Second, the state’s ethnic 
groups may engage in joint collective self-determination of their common affairs. For 
example, one might think of the “combined populations of Bosnia as constituting a unit to 
which the ideal of self-determination applies” (McMahan 1996, 16). The latter type of 
collective self-determination is quintessentially political, based on power sharing in common 
state-level institutions that, ideally, will facilitate peaceful compromise end ensure that all 
groups have a stake in the political process.  
Joint collective self-determination in ethnically diverse societies, however, is often 
fragile. Indeed, it may break down entirely when crude nationalism motivates two or more 
distinct communities to resort to war in a struggle for control of the state, as happened in 
Bosnia during the early 1990s (McMahan 1996, 19–20). Certainly no joint political 
community exists when one group turns savagely on another in an outbreak of genocidal 
violence (Walzer 1977, 101). In such circumstances, international support for ethnonational 
partition or secession may seem appealing in the abstract; however, it is usually imprudent 
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because it may embolden restive minorities elsewhere and result in “reverse victimization,” 
whereby former victims become the oppressors in their newly independent state.3 Liberal 
countries that intervene to stop genocide are therefore left with the difficult task of bringing 
the political community back together, so that peaceful coexistence and joint self-
determination among the country’s established groups become possible once again.  
The domestic political process in societies torn apart by acute ethnic violence can be 
expected to provide majority groups with few incentives to commit to power sharing with and 
constitutional guarantees for ethnic minorities. In such contexts, as Horowitz (2014, 8) 
explains, typically “majorities want majority rule; [meanwhile,] minorities want guarantees 
against majority rule.”4 Therefore, although local ownership and self-determination must be 
the end, during the postwar transition, a heavy international footprint is often justified. 
Outside interveners may need to go beyond simply stopping the violence and continue to act 
paternalistically for some time thereafter, pushing and prodding domestic political actors to 
ensure that minority interests are taken into account—beginning at the constitution-making 
stage (Recchia 2009). Outsiders may even legitimately exercise “quasi-sovereign powers on a 
temporary basis” when no functioning government exists to provide basic public goods and 
foster inclusive power-sharing institutions (Chesterman 2004, 244; see also Paris 2004, 206).  
Research suggests that in divided societies recovering from acute ethnic violence, 
inclusive power sharing offers the best chance of making peace self-sustaining (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003; Joshi and Mason 2011). It remains an open question, however, whether 
minority protection and joint collective self-determination in such contexts also require—or 
are always best achieved by—Western-style electoral democracy, and thus whether 
international peacebuilding should as a matter of course also entail democracy building. 
                                                 
3 See Kumar (1997). Buchanan (2003, chap. 8) nevertheless theorizes a carefully circumscribed “remedial right 
to secede” for national minorities that have experienced mass atrocities.  
4 For this reason, the “autonomous recovery” model based on endogenous stabilization by local parties 
(Weinstein 2005) is frequently unworkable and/or incompatible with basic safeguards for minority groups. 
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Political transformation after international intervention 
Most theorists deny that ending tyranny and promoting democracy can, by themselves, 
constitute a just cause for military intervention. Even when states do have a just cause for 
intervening (e.g., self-defense or collective security), it is commonly held that in most 
circumstances, once victorious, the interveners do not have a right to engage in deep political 
reconstruction and ought to “respect to the greatest extent possible the sovereignty of the 
defeated nation” (Bass 2004, 392; see also Orend 2006, 169; Doyle 2015, 169–70).5 Thus, in 
the aftermath of wars of counterterrorism or counterproliferation, external interveners ought 
to hold back from sweeping constitutional transformation: local elites should, for the most 
part, be left to manage their country’s affairs, and outsiders should interfere only as far as 
necessary to prevent the country from again becoming a terrorist safe haven or proliferator of 
weapons of mass destruction (Bass 2004, 394).  
Many contemporary liberals, however, believe that genocide is different. Regimes that 
have carried out or abetted this particular crime, we are told, “have no international standing” 
(Bass 2004, 399). The underlying assumption is that genocide—the intentional destruction, in 
whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, or religious group—is the summum malum, the supreme 
evil. From this, scholars derive a twofold normative argument: first, humanitarian military 
intervention is justified and indeed may be required to end the killing; second, after the killing 
stops, the genocidal regime’s continued existence cannot be tolerated because, apart from 
threatening the peace, it would be an affront to the most deeply held values of the liberal 
community of nations.6  
 
                                                 
5 For a radical perspective that justifies interventions to end tyranny, see Téson 2005. 
6 In Walzer’s (1977, 113, 114) words, when a political regime is “actively hostile to the very existence of entire 
peoples… [its] criminality… threatens those deep values that political independence and territorial integrity 
merely stand for in the international order.” 
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A duty to democratize genocidal states? 
Among those who are willing to endorse a vigorous dose of international paternalism in the 
service of postwar democracy promotion is Brian Orend, “arguably the most influential writer 
on jus post bellum” (Melandri 2011, 243). Orend (2006, 95–96) writes that humanitarian 
military intervention “is morally obligatory” in the presence of large-scale government 
brutality. Once the atrocities stop, justice requires punishment of the perpetrators. This is 
achieved through war crimes trials, the imposition of reparations, and “political 
rehabilitation”—by which he means constitutional transformation (Orend 2006, 169). Any 
political rehabilitation should be “proportional to the degree of depravity inherent in the 
[domestic] political structure itself” (Orend 2002, 51). In postgenocidal contexts, just 
punishment requires that the “regime be forcibly dismantled” (50), with the goal of “deep 
structural transformation toward a peaceable liberal democratic society” (56). This 
“imposition of institutional therapy” is not only a matter of punishment; it is also required to 
prevent future aggression and to enable peaceful collective self-determination (52). 
Gary Bass (2004, 400) similarly argues that humanitarian interveners have a “jus post 
bellum duty to reconstruct… genocidal states.” Such political reconstruction, he clarifies, 
amounts to constitutional transformation, or “remaking a regime” (398). It is “the final piece 
of business of a humanitarian intervention to stop genocide” (398–99). For Bass, too, political 
reconstruction is primarily matter of punishment; but it must also enable peaceful self-
determination and thus “be pedagogical or reformist, not simply retributive” (396). Bass does 
not make his belief in a duty to democratize explicit (he merely affirms that “broad political 
reconstruction” is mandated [412]). Nevertheless, this belief emerges from his overall 
argument: after discussing the reasons that mandate broad reconstruction for genocidal states, 
Bass notes that “there may also be a case for a more limited kind of foreign reconstruction” 
when the defeat of a dictatorial regime that was not outright genocidal leaves the country on 
the verge of anarchy (403). In such cases, he argues, “the society need not be built up into a 
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stable liberal democracy… The standard would probably be the Rawlsian category of well-
ordered [i.e., decent] peoples” (403). It follows that the broader reconstruction that Bass has 
in mind for genocidal states requires something beyond Rawls’s category of decent peoples—
which can really only mean liberal democracy.  
What constitutes a “genocidal state,” however, is far from self-evident. The 
paradigmatic case, central to Walzer’s (1977, 111–16) discussion in Just and Unjust Wars, is 
Nazi Germany. Adopting a broader definition, Bass (2004, 399–402, at 399) suggests that 
even “relatively localized butchers without global transformational objectives” who commit 
or support acts of genocide during civil wars—such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia—should 
count as the leaders of genocidal states and ought to be dealt with accordingly. But the focus 
is still on oppressive governments; hence Bass excludes, without good reason, weak and 
fragile states such as Uganda and Burundi, where political violence carried out by nonstate 
actors operating without regime support “often becomes sufficiently extreme and group-
targeted that it qualifies as genocide” (de Waal, Meierhenrich, and Conley-Zilkic 2012, 28). 
Nonstate militias such as those representing the Bosnian Serbs during the 1990s or 
contemporary radical Salafi Islamist movements are often no less dangerous to other ethnic 
communities than the armies of oppressive nationalistic governments. Therefore, instances of 
government-sponsored genocide and genocide carried out by nonstate actors ought to be 
treated in the same way.7 
 
Beyond punishment 
Moralized arguments about genocidal states are “relentlessly backward-looking,” too focused 
on punishing and remedying the wrongs done by abusive strongmen, often at the risk of 
                                                 
7 One may also question whether singling out genocide is in fact warranted: according to a United Nations report 
on Darfur, there is no hierarchy of international crimes, with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
all constituting “serious violations of international humanitarian law” that deserve the same degree of 
opprobrium and condemnation (United Nations 2005, 129). 
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inflicting further deprivations on vulnerable civilian populations (Lazar 2014, 218; see also 
Fixdal 2012, 3–22). The most important goal of postwar justice should be to relieve human 
suffering and build durable peace—especially in the aftermath of civil wars. Consequently, 
arguments about postbellum constitutional transformation should be primarily forward 
looking, meaning that punishment and compensation, while important, ought to be of 
secondary significance. Recently, scholars have developed arguments in favor of postbellum 
democracy promotion that have a more explicitly consequentialist flavor: promoting 
democracy is no longer portrayed as a duty linked to punishment but simply as a highly 
desirable means to achieve peaceful collective self-determination.  
Walzer (2012, 38), for instance, dismisses maximalist postbellum objectives “in the 
case of humanitarian intervention.” He notes that “the United States is not obligated to create 
a Swedish-style social democracy… for the simple reason that we can’t do that” (42; 
emphasis added). Nevertheless, he is drawn toward the conclusion that interveners should 
“aim at a democratically elected government” because modern democracy enables self-
determination and “offers greater protection [of ethnic minority rights and other human rights] 
than a regime of oligarchs, patriarchal chiefs, or clerics” (44). Doyle (2015, 148–49, 166–70) 
similarly supports postbellum “transformational peacebuilding” aimed at establishing 
democracy—not in all circumstances, but clearly when domestic groups in divided societies 
appear unable to negotiate a peace agreement by themselves, and a fortiori to mark a new 
political beginning based on peaceful collective self-determination and respect for minority 
rights after genocide (for similar arguments, see also Stahn 2006; Jacob 2014; Pattison 2015).  
  
Democracy and minority rights in deeply divided societies 
Does democracy actually help protect minority rights in deeply divided societies recovering 
from genocide and other forms of acute ethnic violence? Modern electoral democracy, 
broadly speaking, can take two forms: majoritarian, in which the party or coalition that wins a 
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majority (and sometimes a mere plurality) of the vote in a popular election holds political 
power, or consociational, in which power sharing among a society’s established ethnic groups 
is achieved through reserved seats for minorities in the cabinet, the parliament, and the civil 
service (Lijphart 1999, 2–8).  
Research shows that consolidated liberal democracy based on the rule of law— 
regardless whether majoritarian or consociational—is more likely than other forms of 
government to constrain would-be oppressors and facilitate peaceful domestic conflict 
resolution; however, “authorities do not perceive any constraints on repression… until the 
highest levels of democracy have been achieved” (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 551). 
Meanwhile, processes of democratization systematically increase state repression (Davenport 
2007). Many transitions to democracy remain incomplete, especially in ethnically divided 
societies, as these societies adopt competitive elections but, absent a liberal political culture 
and sustainable elite bargains in favor of open government, stop far short of the liberal 
democracy threshold (Ottaway 2007; Hinnebusch 2014). 
When majoritarian democracy is introduced in fragile, deeply divided societies, 
tyrannical rule by ethnic majorities may become a quasi-permanent feature of the political 
landscape. As Michael Mann argues in The Dark Side of Democracy (2005, 2), “democracy 
has always carried with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize minorities, and this 
possibility carries more ominous consequences in certain types of multiethnic 
environments”—especially when “political institutions are weak and affected by war” (7). 
Under Westminster-style majoritarian democracy, plurality voting systems such as first past 
the post ensure that the largest group simply needs to obtain more votes than any of its 
competitors to control all levers of political power. Lijphart (1999, 7) notes that such “pure” 
majoritarian democracies are relatively rare. But even electoral systems based on proportional 
representation can result in majoritarian democracy, especially in ethnically divided societies 
in which one group makes up more than half of the electorate. Majoritarian democracy 
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typically produces executive dominance, which in postwar societies may leave strong 
presidents or prime ministers with few incentives to refrain from repressing minorities.   
Consociational democracy, also known as power-sharing democracy, is almost by 
definition more inclusive. In its pure form, consociational democracy involves the 
participation of all ethnic groups in a “grand coalition” government. Furthermore, there are 
reserved seats for minorities in parliament and the civil service; minority groups are granted 
ample autonomy, often through territorial self-rule; and each group holds a right to veto 
central government decisions that it perceives as harmful to its “vital interests” (Lijphart 
1977, 25–42). The goal is to reassure ethnic minorities and provide them with a stake in the 
society’s politics. However, by elevating ethnocultural divisions to the main feature of a 
society’s political life, consociational democracy raises a host of problems of its own.  
Consociational democracy often sustains ethnic conflict at high levels. Since many 
government posts are allocated according to predetermined ethnic quotas, electoral 
competition takes place primarily within communities rather than on a broader national 
platform. Political leaders thus may be unable to compromise across group lines because they 
risk being outflanked by more radical challengers from within their own group who engage in 
“ethnic outbidding” (Chandra 2005). The resulting political climate makes interethnic 
cooperation and compromise difficult, and it is likely to result in frequent decision-making 
deadlock (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the largest 
group(s) will abide by the constitution’s consociational provisions (Chesterman 2004, 211–
15; Horowitz 2014). Finally, consociational democracy often results in enforced within-group 
conformity and gives rise to the problem of “minorities within minorities” that are left 
unprotected (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005).  
Next, I briefly discuss recent international efforts to promote postwar majoritarian 
democracy (Afghanistan and Iraq) and consociational democracy (Bosnia-Herzegovina) to 
illustrate the problematic nature of such efforts. Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
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were not primarily motivated by humanitarian concerns, although in both cases, the 
intervening states mentioned the regime’s mistreatment of civilians as an additional 
justification for military action. Regardless of what motivated these interventions, the 
resulting collapse of existing authority structures at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
laid bare extreme ethnosectarian divisions. This makes the circumstances of Western efforts at 
democracy promotion in Afghanistan and Iraq similar to those that humanitarian interveners 
are likely to encounter after they have used force to stop genocide.  
 
Majoritarian democracy: Afghanistan and Iraq 
In Afghanistan, the United States supervised the establishment of a majoritarian form of 
democracy after it forcibly toppled the Taliban regime in 2001. A broad-based constitutional 
Loya Jirga (Grand Council) of 500 Afghan delegates was convened in 2003 to deliberate on 
and approve a new constitution; however, the constitution’s core provisions were drafted by a 
small commission appointed by Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s U.S.-backed interim president. 
Karzai and his ethnic Pashtun supporters wanted a majoritarian form of democracy with a 
strong, directly elected president (Rubin 2004, 6–13). Since Pashtuns make up at least 45 
percent of the country’s population, their expectation was that this would result in permanent 
Pashtun rule. The U.S. special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, supported the idea of a directly 
elected, strong central executive, believing that this would facilitate postwar reconstruction 
and enable a rapid withdrawal of American troops (Thier 2010, 548–51).  
The representatives of various Afghan minority groups, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, and 
Hazaras, favored consociational power sharing with a parliamentary form of government and 
a grand coalition-type central executive. Karzai and Khalilzad, however, pushed through their 
preferred solution: since the rules of procedure for the constitutional Loya Jirga were unclear, 
the constitution was considered ratified when a majority of delegates, mostly Pashtuns, stood 
up to show their support in January 2004 (Rubin 2004, 11–13; Thier 2010, 550–54). Pashtuns 
13 
 
have dominated Afghan politics ever since, with little incentive to reach out to minority 
communities and provide public goods in an inclusive manner. Interethnic reconciliation has 
not been a priority, governmental discrimination against minority communities remains 
rampant, and Afghan authorities systematically violate the personal integrity rights of ethnic 
minority citizens (HRW 2015a, 46–51; DOS 2016, 47–51). Crucially, majoritarian democratic 
rule has done little to improve political stability and indeed may have harmed prospects for 
interethnic peace (Ottaway 2007; Nixon and Hartzell 2011).  
The United States also helped establish a majoritarian form of democracy in Iraq after 
it invaded the country in 2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Sunni regime. Iraq’s 
2005 national electoral law, devised by the United States in cooperation with the United 
Nations secretariat, created a system of pure proportional representation with a single 
nationwide electoral district. Since Shias make up approximately 60 percent of Iraq’s 
population, the electoral law practically ensured that the Shia community would dominate the 
democratically elected constitutional assembly—hence the constitution-making process as 
well and, by implication, Iraqi politics thereafter (Arato 2009, 207–9; Morrow 2010, 574–82).  
In the absence of constitutionally mandated power sharing, subsequent national 
elections based on party-list proportional representation enabled Iraq’s Shias to control most 
federal cabinet posts (ICG 2013). In 2010, under international pressure, Iraq’s main political 
parties agreed that, henceforth, the country’s president would be a Kurd, the prime minister a 
Shia, and the speaker of parliament a Sunni—however, this has not yielded substantial power 
sharing, as the positions of president and speaker of parliament are largely symbolic (Visser 
2010). Iraq’s democratically sanctioned Shia dominance has produced significant pressures on 
Iraq’s Sunnis, including serious human rights violations involving “mass detentions and 
trumped-up terrorism charges” (Arango 2015). This systematic discrimination, in turn, has led 
to growing Sunni support for radical Islamist opposition movements, including Al Qaeda and 
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the so-called Islamic State, deeply destabilizing the country (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 
157–61). 
 
Consociational democracy: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Consociational democracy, as noted, can yield more inclusive governance in ethnically 
divided societies. The postwar constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, imposed by the United 
States and its NATO allies as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, is a textbook 
example of consociational democracy.8 The Dayton constitution sought to combine generous 
self-government rights for each of Bosnia’s three “constituent peoples”—Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs—with the preservation of a unitary state based on ethnic power sharing. 
The territory was divided into two autonomous entities, a majority-Serb Republika Srpska and 
a Muslim-Croat Federation, and most governmental functions were devolved to the entity 
level or further downward. Bosnia’s head of state is a three-person power-sharing body 
composed of a Bosnian Muslim, a Croat, and a Serb member. All important decisions 
concerning Bosnia as a whole have to be adopted by consensus, and each group has the ability 
to block legislation that it regards as contrary to its “vital interests” (Belloni 2008, 44–50). 
This intricate arrangement may have helped preserve political stability in the war’s 
immediate aftermath. However, the institutional framework adopted at Dayton has elevated 
ethnocultural divisions into the defining characteristic of the country’s political life. This has 
sustained ethnic conflict at high levels and, combined with a very cumbersome decision-
making structure, has yielded frequent deadlock, hampering Bosnia’s progress toward 
sustainable peace and European integration (Recchia 2007). The lack of meaningful checks on 
political power holders within each community has also resulted in persistent human rights 
                                                 
8 The new constitution was drafted entirely by U.S. and European lawyers and presented to the local parties as 
Annex 4 of the Peace Agreement on a “take it or leave it” basis. According to James O’Brien (2010, 344), a 
former State Department lawyer who was involved in the drafting, the “negotiations took place under a blackout, 
with neither informal public consultation during negotiations, nor formal… democratic approval thereafter.”  
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violations (HRW 2015a, 110–13). Discrimination against members of other ethnic groups 
besides the country’s three officially recognized ones is a particularly serious problem 
(Council of Europe 2014).  
In short, if the objective is to safeguard ethnic minority interests after acute ethnic 
violence, then consociationalism appears preferable to majoritarian rule. Consociational 
democracy, however, favors competitive intergroup bargaining over deliberation and sustains 
communal conflict at high levels; thus, it may not be conducive to self-sustaining peace. 
Indeed, in Bosnia, more than two decades after the end of the war, the international 
community maintains an intrusive presence, which it deems necessary to prevent ethnic 
tensions from spiraling out of control (Merzdanovic 2017).  
 
Is democracy necessary for collective self-determination? 
It might be argued that humanitarian interveners nevertheless ought to promote electoral 
democracy in societies torn apart by genocide because democracy is the only means by which 
the goal of inclusive collective self-determination can be approximated, however imperfectly. 
Yet democracy is not necessary to that end. In his extended essay The Law of Peoples (1999), 
Rawls made a powerful case that inclusive self-determination can be achieved through less 
than democratic political institutions, as long as they enable the representation of socially 
relevant groups. 
 
Rawls’s decent hierarchical societies 
Rawls (1999, 85) emphasizes that “self-determination… is an important good for a people, 
and the foreign policy of liberal peoples should recognize that good.” He illustrates the 
features that would make a nondemocratic society self-determining (and thus deserving of full 
international recognition and respect) by describing a hypothetical “decent hierarchical” 
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people whose individual members are “viewed in public life as members of different groups” 
(64). This allows for the possibility that these groups be of an ascriptive nature, ethnic or 
otherwise.9 What particular features, then, make a decent hierarchical society self-
determining? 
 
Effective and legitimate laws that protect basic human rights 
To begin with, a decent hierarchical society is endowed with an effective system of law that is 
not merely supported by force but instead enjoys widespread domestic legitimacy. The 
society’s laws are both normatively legitimate, in the sense of being guided by a common 
good idea of justice that imposes “bona fide moral duties and obligations on all persons within 
the people’s territory,” and sociologically legitimate, in the sense that these persons sincerely 
believe that the laws are guided by a common good idea of justice (Rawls 1999, 65–66). For 
Rawls, the exercise of political power is legitimate only when it is in accordance with a basic 
structure that the society’s members can accept as appropriate (Wenar 2006, 100). 
  While some ethnocultural groups may enjoy privileged status and access to political 
office (for instance, Islam might be “the favored religion” in a society in which “only 
Muslims can hold the upper positions of political authority” [Rawls 1999, 75]), minorities are 
made to feel included and more generally are not “subjected to arbitrary discrimination, or 
treated as inferior” (Rawls 1999, 76). The requirement that minorities be included and treated 
as members also involves protection of basic human rights, such as freedom from slavery and 
serfdom, formal equality under the law, and protection of the right to life—including “security 
of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide” (79; see also 65). Such basic human rights, 
as opposed to the full set of liberal rights that “citizens have in a reasonable constitutional 
democra[cy]” (78), “cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western 
                                                 
9 This possibility is made explicit a few pages later. Assuming, for example, that the society’s majority religion 
was Islam, Rawls (1999, 76; emphasis added) notes, a “decent people is marked by its enlightened treatment of 
various non-Islamic religions and other minorities who have been living on its territory for generations.” 
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tradition” (65). Rawls insists that basic human rights are “necessary conditions of any system 
of social cooperation” (68). Put differently, they are “conditions of membership or inclusion”: 
the protection of such basic rights indicates that people are treated as members, which is 
necessary for genuine collective self-determination (Cohen 2006, 233).  
 
Public consultation and deliberation 
Furthermore, the political institutions of a decent hierarchical society include a public 
consultation mechanism that “provides an opportunity for different voices to be heard” and to 
be taken into account by policymakers (Rawls 1999, 72). Each of the society’s principal 
groups is represented by a body in the consultation hierarchy. Special care has to be taken to 
ensure an adequate representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups, including women 
and ethnic minorities, which “must be represented by a body that contains at least some of the 
group’s own members” (77, 71–78 more generally). Although there is no democratic 
accountability, “the rulers… must weigh the views and claims of each of the bodies 
consulted” and, if called upon, “must explain and justify” their decisions in public (77). In 
other words, each group has a right to “express political dissent, and the government has an 
obligation to take a group’s dissent seriously” and respond to it (72).  
The goal of the public consultation structure is to promote deliberation on the public 
good and enable representative rule, albeit of a nondemocratic kind. Rawls (1999, 51) notes 
that “public deliberation is vital for a reasonable… regime, and specific arrangements need to 
be laid down to support and encourage it.” The need for political authorities to offer public 
justifications for their decisions does not automatically ensure public-regarding outcomes. 
However, it can be expected to have a prophylactic effect: “by disciplining the kinds of 
reasons that may be offered in support of legislation, it should increase the likelihood that 
[public-regarding outcomes] will come about” (Sunstein 1993, 200).  
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Rawls’s central point is that decent societies that respect the basic rights of people 
living on their territory and that are effectively self-determining should be free from external 
interference. Cosmopolitan liberals have taken issue with this argument: Rawls’s decent 
societies, they point out, do not recognize all their members as fully equal and autonomous, 
thus falling lamentably short of liberal justice (see, e.g., Téson 1995; Tan 2006). Clearly 
inspired by republican liberalism, however, Rawls in the Law of Peoples recognizes the moral 
significance of collective self-determination. As Macedo (2004, 1738) sums up the Rawlsian 
argument, due respect for the project of collective self-determination “requires that just [i.e., 
liberal-democratic] societies resist the impulse simply to universalize principles arrived at 
within the horizons of one people’s institutions, history, and culture.” 
For our purposes, the main insight from the foregoing discussion is that if the goal is 
to enable peaceful collective self-determination after mass atrocities, democracy promotion 
may be unnecessary. Instead, it may be sufficient for international interveners to facilitate the 
emergence of postwar political institutions that come as close as possible to the Rawlsian 
threshold of decency. It is worth stressing that Rawls’s “decent hierarchical society” is an 
ideal type: as Doyle (2006) shows, only a few societies in the contemporary world—notably, 
in the Persian Gulf and perhaps in Central Asia—approximate the ideal, but they do so 
imperfectly. That said, the Rawlsian ideal type of a just liberal democracy, too, is unlikely to 
be met fully in any really existing society. Hence, approximation of Rawls’s ideal types is 
probably the best we can hope for.  
 
Toward hybrid governance 
The introduction of electoral democracy in divided societies that have recently experienced 
large-scale ethnic violence, as noted, is problematic because it is likely to result in either 
quasi-permanent domination of the political process by majority groups or deadlocked 
decision making marked by destabilizing forms of ethnic outbidding. International actors 
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intent on countering these tendencies and ensuring that nominally democratic institutions do 
not plunge such societies back into violence may have to maintain a highly intrusive, 
trusteeship-like presence for a prolonged period—vetting candidates for democratic elections, 
setting the domestic political agenda, and even imposing particular policies (Tansey 2009).  
 I argue that to obviate the need for open-ended trusteeship, those who intervene to stop 
genocide and other forms of acute ethnic violence should not merely stop short of imposing 
democratic institutions based on competitive elections; instead, especially for societies that 
lack prior experience with liberal democratic rule, outside interveners should consider 
encouraging the adoption of postwar constitutions that limit democracy. Put differently, 
outsiders should seek to promote consociational, or power-sharing, political institutions; but 
to maximize the odds that these institutions will result in inclusive and effective governance, 
it may be worth tempering the institutions’ democratic character—even when the largest 
ethnic groups demand full electoral democracy, anticipating that they will benefit at the polls.  
 
Preventing “disruption from below” 
Concretely, when it comes to reshaping the constitutional structure of divided societies 
recovering from genocide and other forms of acute ethnic violence, international interveners 
should explore the possibility of promoting hybrid political institutions that combine some 
electoral accountability with reliance on unelected, customary authorities. Customary 
authorities enjoy significant social legitimacy in many low-income societies outside the 
Western world, whether in sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, or the South Pacific. Taking a 
society’s prior history as a starting point, customary authorities could be integrated into the 
new postwar institutional architecture either nationally (at the central government level) or 
locally (at the district or municipality level). At the national level, customary authorities such 
as clan elders, religious leaders, and members of the traditional nobility could contribute to 
law making through a second, unelected legislative assembly—along the lines of Britain’s 
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House of Lords. At the subnational level, assemblies of traditional leaders and consultation 
structures in which traditional chiefs or clan elders deliberate on public affairs with the public 
could become part of the recognized (and internationally supported) institutional architecture.  
Relying on democratic elections as the only source of political authority in 
postgenocidal societies risks subjecting carefully balanced elite pacts to “disruption from 
below,” since the mass public, still traumatized by the violence, is likely to be susceptible to 
extremist bids for support from nationalistic politicians (Chandra 2005; Sisk 2008). By 
contrast, including customary leaders who are not directly dependent on the support of 
democratic majorities into the state’s mechanisms of political representation can facilitate 
pragmatic problem-solving and intergroup accommodation. As Menkhaus (2000, 197) notes 
with regard to the Horn of Africa region, “elders and other traditional peacemakers are usually 
a force for reconciliation.” While the ability of such traditional leaders to resolve intergroup 
conflicts is “constrained by the material interests of the communities to which they belong,” 
they usually do not need to rely on narrow ethnopopulism for their legitimacy and hence can 
take a broader view of the society’s good (197).  
More generally, the inclusion of customary authorities in the new postwar institutional 
architecture holds the promise of imbuing the entire state-building project with “grounded 
legitimacy” (Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009; see also Chopra and Hohe 2004). Scholars 
have long emphasized that the prospects for lasting peace are greater when the newly 
established postwar political institutions are in accord with custom and viewed as legitimate 
by the local population (see, e.g. Bhuta 2010; Wallis 2014). Hybrid governance that 
incorporates local customary practices may therefore contribute to the Rawlsian goal of 
“stability for the right reasons,” whereby a society’s members internalize the principles of 
justice embodied in the society’s institutions and learn to cooperate peacefully in accordance 
with those principles (Rawls 1999, 44–45).  
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To the extent that preexisting customary governance structures are fundamentally 
abusive and violate basic human rights, they are in need of reform. But frequently, existing 
customary governance structures with roots in the precolonial period reflect indigenous 
traditions of public consultation and inclusive rule; thus, they may offer a platform for a 
diversity of voices and opinions to be expressed and be quite responsive to people’s needs. In 
short, they can be representative and protect basic human rights even as they fall short of 
formal democracy (Belloni 2012). One recent study even suggests that hybrid governance 
increases the likelihood that public funds will benefit the broader population in fragile states, 
as traditional chiefs who are deeply socially embedded in their communities are well placed to 
facilitate the implementation of local development projects (Baldwin 2016). 
 
In defense of partial electoral accountability 
In an important study, Barnett (2006) touts the merits of unelected assemblies made up of 
traditional leaders at the postwar reconstruction stage, as instruments for promoting the 
discovery of common interests among former warring parties. For Barnett, such unelected 
assemblies should be viewed as relatively short-term transitional arrangements that may 
remain in place for several months “until elections are appropriate” and, during this period, 
“can perform the function of representation” (2006, 102). My argument differs from Barnett’s 
in two ways: first, I argue that unelected assemblies should coexist with, rather than replace, 
democratic bodies; second, I argue that such unelected assemblies might be useful to 
consolidate state building in the medium to long term, over a period of several years. My 
argument is closer to Chopra and Hohe’s claim (2004, 301) that when indigenous structures 
are already functioning and fairly inclusive, or can be revived and made more representative 
with outside help, “it may not make sense to conduct a [deeper] social engineering project in 
the short term,… equally, it may not make sense to seek to transform the existing structures in 
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the long term, because of their acceptability and usefulness as the foundation for state-
building efforts.”  
In principle, following the Rawlsian framework, to the extent that a representative 
political process could be sustained in the absence of any electoral accountability, we should 
tolerate it and respect it. Rawls explains that his “remarks about a decent hierarchical society 
are conceptual,” and “should [such a society] exist… it should be tolerated politically” (1999, 
75 n. 16; see also Tan 2006, 77–80). In practice, however, it is unclear that a system that relies  
exclusively on indigenous consultation structures and unelected assemblies would be capable 
of providing adequate safeguards against a progressive degeneration into tyranny. Absent 
continued international interference, a powerful, charismatic ruler might be able to co-opt his 
or her allies into the unelected assembly, thus reducing its representative character and 
gradually eroding any checks on executive power (see also Christiano 2011, 156–59). Hence 
my argument that unelected assemblies should be combined with elements of democratic 
(electoral) accountability.10  
The resulting arrangements would resemble a classical “mixed constitution” 
incorporating elements of democracy and traditional aristocracy, as discussed and praised by 
thinkers from Plato and Polybius to the republican liberals of the Federalist Papers. For 
ancient and medieval European thinkers, in particular, the main purpose of the mixed 
constitution was to foster accountable government while moderating the impact of popular 
rule by ensuring that the nobles and the people would check and balance each other (Blythe 
1992, chap. 2). Similarly, today, in divided societies recovering from ethnic violence, mixed 
or hybrid political institutions could ensure representative government while providing a 
bulwark against nationalistic disruption from below.  
                                                 
10 It would also be hard to argue that international actors, on their own authority, should resist democracy 
entirely when it is demanded by important domestic groups, even though these groups may demand it for self-
interested reasons. For a similar argument, see Doyle (2015, 165–71). 
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Once a postwar society becomes collectively self-determining, in the sense that 
political decisions reflect the views and interests of all established communities and basic 
human rights are generally respected, the question of whether that society should advance on 
the path toward liberalism and democracy or maintain a decent but only partially democratic 
hybrid political structure should be answered by none but the affected population itself, 
relying on its own mechanisms of political representation.11 As Rawls (1999, 61) reminds us, 
“it is surly, ceteris paribus, a good for individuals and associations to be attached to their 
particular culture” and to live under political institutions that as much as possible reflect and 
express that culture. “If a liberal constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior,” he points out, 
then liberals should trust that a decent society will over time “recognize the advantages of 
liberal institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on its own” (62).  
 
Hybrid governance in practice 
To illustrate the possible benefits of hybrid governance for war-torn societies, I briefly discuss 
two real-world examples, Somaliland and Bougainville. These examples are imperfect in 
several respects. Although both are largely self-governing territories marked by significant 
ethnocultural diversity and a history of violent communal conflict, neither is yet an 
internationally recognized sovereign state; moreover, in Somaliland, international actors 
played only a very limited role. Finally, respect for basic human rights, an important 
characteristic of decent societies, is far from universally achieved in either territory.  
Nevertheless, these examples are helpful insofar as they indicate that customary bodies 
may be fruitfully combined with democratically elected ones to promote inclusive, socially 
legitimate governance and durable peace. I thus emphasize the “inclusive governance” 
element of the Rawlsian conception of decency above other components. Somaliland and 
                                                 
11 Hence my argument differs from arguments in favor of delayed democratization, or “institutionalization before 
democratization” (see, e.g., Paris 2004), which still view democracy as the only possible long-term goal.  
24 
 
Bougainville are free from systematic violence against or enslavement of political opponents 
and ethnocultural minorities. Furthermore, the main ethnic groups, clans, and tribes are 
included in the political process and help shape collective decisions, even though some groups 
enjoy privileged status. Regarding shortcomings in human rights protection (discrimination 
against women, for instance, remains pervasive in both societies), these phenomena, while 
serious, should be kept in perspective: in divided societies recovering from communal 
violence, human rights violations are often widespread regardless of the political system. 
International actors should do more to promote respect for basic human rights in such 
societies, but introducing full electoral democracy, as noted, will not necessarily make the 
task easier and could make it more difficult.  
 
Somaliland 
The “Republic of Somaliland” has been a de facto independent state since it broke away from 
Somalia in 1991. That year, a rebel movement drawing support from Somaliland’s main clan, 
the Isaaq, unilaterally declared the territory’s independence. Most other local clans and 
subclans supported the declaration, but some did not, resulting in a turbulent transition 
marked by significant communal violence. In 1992, Somaliland’s clan elders negotiated a 
cease-fire, and over the next several months they consolidated the peace, initiating a bottom-
up state-building project. They created a national legislative council of elders (the Guurti) and 
established an inclusive interim government led by Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, an experienced 
Isaaq politician who had served as Somalia’s prime minister in the 1960s. These initial stages 
of postwar governance were marked by a representative, if entirely undemocratic, political 
process: for several years, the government was essentially a power-sharing coalition of 
Somaliland’s main clans and subclans. As the security situation improved by the mid- to late 
1990s, the government was able to restore essential services, set up state ministries, 
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reintegrate displaced populations, and establish a rudimentary legal system and police force 
(Richards 2014, 101–9).  
Somaliland’s carefully calibrated system of clan-based governance, however, 
“remained politically vulnerable to shifts in power relationships between the clans” 
(Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf 2003, 461; see also Renders and Terlinden 2010, 729–30). In 
1997, to make the system more resilient, Somaliland’s clan leaders began drafting a new 
constitution that introduced elements of democratic representation. President Egal and several 
clan elders also believed that a partial democratization of the system would help gain 
international recognition for Somaliland as an independent state (Richards 2014, 116–17). At 
the same time, many locals reportedly felt that the peace and stability enjoyed during the 
interim period were more important than democratic elections, and they worried about the 
implications of moving toward a more competitive political system based on majority rule. 
Somaliland’s permanent constitution, drafted by clan leaders and adopted in a popular 
referendum in 2001, sought to strike a balance between these concerns (Bradbury, Abokor, 
and Yusuf 2003, 464; see also Richards 2014, 149). 
The 2001 constitution established a new hybrid political system that combines 
elements of electoral democracy with traditional clan-based governance. The president of 
Somaliland and members of the lower legislative chamber, the house of representatives, are 
democratically elected by universal suffrage; meanwhile, the upper house, or house of elders 
(known as the Guurti), is a nonelected assembly whose membership is drawn from the clan 
elders. The upper house reviews legislation adopted by the house of representatives, but it can 
return a bill only once—meaning that if the house of representatives votes to push the bill 
back unchanged, it is considered adopted. (If the upper house refuses a bill by a two-thirds 
majority, the lower house needs to approve it by the same majority to overcome the elders’ 
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veto12). In this way, the house of elders functions as a check on majority rule and promotes 
consensus-oriented governance, while at the same time the rules of procedure limit the risk of 
decision-making deadlock (see also Hesse 2010). 
The new hybrid political structure has prevented any single group from dominating the 
political process and, according to some observers, “guarded against the re-emergence of 
authoritarian rule” during the postwar transition (Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf 2003, 462). 
Clan-based governance in the region has traditionally been deliberative, with decisions 
reached by consensus (Menkhaus 2000). This tradition has by and large been maintained 
within the new statewide Guurti, providing a useful counterweight to the more competitive 
and sometimes confrontational politics within the democratically elected lower house 
(Richards 2014, 64–73, 138–50; see also Hesse 2010, 71).  
Somaliland’s experience with hybrid governance, largely unassisted by the outside 
world, has not been unproblematic. Given Somaliland’s tradition of consensus-oriented 
governance and the Guurti’s consociational structure, a parliamentary form of government 
might have been more appropriate than the presidential system that was chosen. President 
Egal, who remained in power until his death in 2002, and subsequent presidents have been 
able to use their paramount position and the lack of clear guidelines for appointment to the 
national Guurti to place many of their loyalists in the upper legislative chamber. This has 
gradually reduced the Guurti’s representative character and its ability to act as a check on 
presidential power (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 733–35; Hoehne 2013, 203–7). Arguably, 
greater international involvement in Somaliland’s state-building project through financial and 
technical assistance, especially if tied to the prospect of international recognition, could have 
resulted in (1) a parliamentary form of government more appropriate for a consociational, 
                                                 
12 Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, Articles 54, 61, 77, accessed October 23, 2017, 
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution/body_somaliland_constitution.htm#_ednref134. See 
also “Somaliland Parliament,” accessed October 23, 2017, 
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/body_somaliland_parliament.html.  
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hybrid political system; (2) a clearer set of criteria for appointment to the national Guurti, 
limiting the president’s prerogative in this field; and (3) better protection of basic human 
rights and higher levels of commitment to gender equality.13  
Nevertheless, measured by the standards of other conflict-torn societies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Somaliland has enjoyed impressive successes. It maintains a high level of public 
security, has built up a modest but functioning state, and, according to the Minority Rights 
Group, an international nongovernmental organization, “awareness and action for minority 
rights have advanced further and faster in Somaliland than in south-central Somalia” and 
elsewhere in the region (Hill 2010). Several studies suggest that Somaliland’s hybrid political 
system has imbued the state-building project with social legitimacy and, in particular, helped 
ensure that the main ethnocultural groups feel included and perceive that they have a stake in 
the political process (Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf 2003, 462–65; Hesse 2010, 81–82; 
Richards 2014, chap. 5).  
 
Bougainville 
Bougainville is a largely self-governing island territory in the South Pacific. To date, it 
remains part of the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG), although it may become a sovereign 
state after an independence referendum scheduled for June 2019 (RNZ 2016). For almost a 
decade between 1989 and 1998, Bougainville was the theater of a bloody civil war that began 
as a conflict over mining revenue but morphed into a communal conflict between pro- and 
anti-independence groups. The civil war in its later stages involved what one observer (Boege 
2010, 338) calls a “complex mixture… of localized sub- or mini-wars between traditional 
societal entities (such as clans or villages).” Consequently, after a cease-fire was achieved in 
early 1998, building peace required bringing a deeply fractured society back together. Peace 
                                                 
13 The human rights situation in Somaliland, while generally better than elsewhere in the Horn of Africa, remains 
precarious, and the participation of women in politics is very low (Hesse 2010, 75). 
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talks mediated by New Zealand yielded a comprehensive peace agreement in 2001 and a 
power-sharing interim government. The interim government then appointed a broad-based 
constitutional commission tasked with drafting a new constitution for the autonomous 
territory. After a two-year deliberation process that included multiple rounds of consultation 
with local groups, Bougainville’s new constitution was adopted in November 2004 (Regan 
2013, 425–26; Wallis 2014, 200–225).  
The new constitution established a hybrid political structure combining liberal 
democracy for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) with customary governance 
at the local level. The ABG’s primary legislative organ is a democratically elected house of 
representatives; its executive branch consists of an “executive council” headed by the 
territory’s directly elected president (who then appoints other members). There are specific 
provisions for the representation of women and regional minorities in both the ABG’s 
legislative and executive branches (Regan 2013, 429). The draft constitution, responding to 
civil society demands that emerged during the consultations, also foresaw an unelected upper 
house composed of customary representatives such as chiefs and other traditional leaders—
similar to Somaliland’s Guurti. However, as a result of concerns expressed by the PNG 
government, the upper house was ultimately downgraded to an “advisory body,” tasked with 
advising the executive branch on constitutional amendments and other matters referred to it 
(Wallis 2014, 267). The advisory body has yet to be established: the constitution simply notes 
that this will happen once the ABG’s efforts “to achieve fiscal self-reliance have progressed 
to the point where the establishment… is sustainable” (BC, art. 52.2). 
At the local level, meanwhile, traditional authorities have to a considerable degree 
been integrated into Bougainville’s new constitutional architecture from the beginning. Wallis 
(2014, 268) reports that during the constitutional consultations, “Bougainvilleans expressed 
their desire for chiefs and local sociopolitical institutions to be recognized as the basis of 
formal government at the village level. People expressed the perception that liberal 
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institutions were ‘remote’ and hard to ‘understand or obey.’” Boege (2010, 346) similarly 
notes that for Bougainville’s majority rural population, the legitimacy of customary 
governance mechanisms “is often much higher than that of the modern state.” The ABG’s 
weak capacity provided additional incentives to revive customary local authority structures in 
order to facilitate the maintenance of public order and the provision of basic services (Regan 
2013, 430).  
Bougainville’s constitution notes that the ABG “shall devolve governmental functions 
and powers to… customary communities” (BC, art. 14.3). The statutes recognize two tiers of 
customary local government: first, there are about 600 village assemblies, led by a traditional 
chief; second, the representatives of several village assemblies together form a district-level 
council of elders (COE), of which there are currently about 90 (Wallis 2014, 268–70). The 
village assemblies approximate a Rawlsian decent consultation structure: traditional village 
chiefs responsible for local government and dispute resolution consult with the village 
population in regular public meetings, which are held about once a week and to which all 
village residents are invited. The meetings usually consist of daylong deliberations, during 
which the chief leads a discussion on village governance and other local issues (Sasa 2013, 
29–31, 52–59; Wallis 2014, 269–73).  
Each village assembly, typically through a consensual deliberative process, also 
appoints its own representative (not necessarily the village chief) to a district-level COE. The 
COEs are vested with legislative, executive, and judicial powers pertaining to the 
maintenance of law and order in their areas. Problems are usually solved by relying on 
custom, and only if this is not possible, statutory law may be invoked (Boege 2010; Wallis 
2014, 270). People can hold local COE members to account through village assembly 
meetings, which they can request for that specific purpose; alternatively, people can ask their 
clan chief to take up their grievances with the local COE member (Sasa 2013, 63–64). 
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While Bougainville approximates Rawlsian decency in terms of inclusive governance, 
significant challenges persist for public policy. Bougainville remains extremely poor in 
socioeconomic terms, even compared with other developing countries in the region—although 
access to basic services has been improving (Chand 2013, 10–15). As in PNG more generally 
and in many traditional Melanesian societies, domestic violence against women remains a 
serious problem, which customary authorities have been unwilling to address decisively 
(HRW 2015b). But here, too, things may be starting to change: the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Support Office recently launched a series of initiatives to raise awareness about 
gender violence across Bougainville and increase women’s participation in village assemblies, 
with encouraging initial results (PBSO 2015). Reportedly, in contrast to only a few years ago, 
it is now quite common for women to outnumber men in village assembly meetings (Palipal 
2015). This suggests that women may, in the future, exert greater influence on local 
policymaking.  
Overall, in spite of the aforementioned challenges, there are strong indications that 
Bougainville’s hybrid institutions have facilitated public goods provision and increased the 
perceived legitimacy of the territory’s political system as a whole (Wallis 2014, 273). Some 
evidence even suggests that public goods are provided at a higher level in Bougainville than 
in the rest of PNG—possibly facilitated by traditional authorities who are deeply embedded in 
and responsive to local communities (Wallis 2014, 281). People’s participation in customary 
local governance also appears to have had a catalytic effect on societal reconciliation (Boege 
2010, 338). Today, ethnocultural minorities are generally well integrated across the territory, 
and the significant Polynesian minority does not experience discrimination (MRG 2017). In 
short, Bougainville’s hybrid institutions, with external support, have helped bring a war-torn 
society back together, fostering inclusive collective self-determination.  
 
 
31 
 
Conclusion 
This article has challenged the predominant view among jus post bellum theorists that when 
liberal countries intervene to stop genocide, they subsequently ought to promote democratic 
political institutions based on competitive elections. Instead, I have argued, in the aftermath of 
acute ethnic violence, genocidal or otherwise, international interveners should consider 
promoting hybrid institutions that limit democracy by combining popularly elected bodies 
with customary authority structures. Especially when a society lacks prior experience with 
liberal democracy, hybrid governance may be better placed than full electoral democracy to 
ensure inclusive, socially legitimate rule and thus to facilitate peaceful self-determination. The 
article’s focus has been on the aftermath of humanitarian interventions to stop genocide, 
mirroring the focus of jus post bellum theorists; however, hybrid institutions such as those 
discussed in this article may offer an appealing solution to the governance problems facing 
divided societies recovering from communal violence more generally.  
Hybrid institutions are no panacea. Customary authorities are often prone to 
corruption, especially when they enjoy lifelong tenure. Hybrid governance may also give rise 
to systems of patronage, as when elected presidents maneuver their own loyalists into 
powerful posts on customary decision-making bodies (Belloni 2012; Hoehne 2013). However, 
these potential flaws should be kept in perspective. Patronage and corruption are often 
endemic in weak states recovering from civil conflict, even when the political system is 
nominally liberal and democratic. Indeed, democratic competition in war-torn societies may 
produce greater incentives to engage in patronage and corruption, as spoilers within each 
community—those engaging in ethnic outbidding—have to be bought off to keep powerful 
centrifugal forces at bay (Cheng and Zaum 2011). Hybrid institutions, meanwhile, can 
provide valuable customary checks on rent seeking and corruption (Boege, Brown, and 
Clements 2009). 
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 Scholars within the critical theory tradition emphasize that “hybridity is not a 
condition that can be crafted in a laboratory and rolled out in neat factory packaging” (Mac 
Ginty and Richmond 2016, 220). Postwar institutions, hybrid or not, should never simply be 
imposed from the outside following a cookie cutter approach. Nevertheless, we ought to take 
seriously the possibility that international actors can play a useful role in fostering the 
emergence and influencing the shape of hybrid postwar political institutions, which in many 
cases could be grafted onto preexisting customary structures. In particular, international actors 
may be able to facilitate the emergence of a representative political process that offers 
adequate safeguards for ethnocultural minorities and protects basic human rights, thus 
approximating the Rawlsian ideal-type of decent governance. The approach outlined in this 
article therefore leaves considerable scope for international interference aimed at setting war-
torn societies on the path toward inclusive collective self-determination; however, inclusive 
self-determination does not require and is not always best achieved by promoting Western-
style democracy.  
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